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Abstract: This manuscript discusses the author’s experience implementing a 
secularized version of Lectio Divina, a medieval monastic contemplative reading 
practice, in an introductory philosophy classroom.  Following brief discussion of Lectio 
Divina’s history and a description of how the practice was modified for the classroom, I 
discuss three benefits (increased attention to cognitive and noncognitive reactions to 
the text, willingness to engage with the material in novel ways, and the opportunity to 
engage in independent disciplinary practice) and three potential challenges (the time 
required, student engagement, and the practice’s perceived religiosity) arising from the 
exercise.  Following this, I discuss potential modifications to the exercise that 
instructors may wish to consider, namely strategies for addressing students’ status as 
novice meditators, focusing textual selections on course materials, and having students 
engage in some aspects of the practice as homework.  
 
1. Introduction 
Contemplative Pedagogy has regularly adapted secularized versions of practices from 
religious traditions with rich contemplative histories (Simmer-Brown, 2013).  One such 
practice is Lectio Divina, a medieval monastic meditative practice.  Though Lectio 
Divina is frequently mentioned in both formal and informal Contemplative Pedagogy 
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literature,2 there has not yet been an extended formal discussion of the practicalities, 
benefits, and challenges of engaging with Lectio Divina as a standalone classroom 
activity.3 
I aim to fill this gap by discussing my experience implementing a daily Lectio 
Divina activity in my Introduction to Philosophy classroom, which provided students 
the ability to reflect on both the cognitive and noncognitive aspects of class material.  I 
identified three benefits to incorporating the practice into my course.  First, students 
were able to engage in and react to noncognitive aspects of philosophical practice, 
aspects that are often ignored in the practice of analytic philosophy.   Second, students 
seemed more willing to engage with the material in novel, interesting, and unexpected 
ways as a result of their engagement with the practice.  Finally, the Lectio Divina 
activity provided students a valuable opportunity to engage in important aspects of 
philosophical practice independent of my instruction.  My hope is that those interested 
in implementing Lectio Divina will come away from this discussion with a fuller 
understanding of both the practice and how it could be successfully implemented into 
one’s own classroom. 
My discussion proceeds as follows.  First, I shall provide a brief overview of 
Lectio Divina in Section 2. I next describe how Lectio Divina was incorporated into my 
Introduction to Philosophy class in Section 3.  Section 4 presents a discussion of the 
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Mind in Society, 2012; Craig, 2011; Keator, 2018; Wright, 2018; Zajonc, 2016). 
3 The closest such discussion has come can be found in Keator’s (2018) discussion of the practice as an 
organizing principle for her World Literature course. In this, she focuses largely on how the various 
individual steps of Lectio Divina has led to broad pedagogical insight and how the individual steps of the 
practice have helped in developing individual assignments and activities (e.g., name-learning activities 
and reflection papers), rather than the sort of independent activity I describe. 
practice’s benefits and challenges, and Section 5 discusses potential changes that might 
make future iterations of the activity more fruitful. 
 
2. A brief overview of Lectio Divina 
This section provides a brief overview of Lectio Divina, with the aim of providing those 
unfamiliar with the practice a rudimentary understanding of its history, steps, and 
goals.  Numerous resources discussing the history of Lectio Divina at length are 
available for those who wish to arrive at a deeper understanding.4   
Lectio Divina (lit. “divine reading”) is—at its most basic level—a monastic 
meditative scriptural reading practice (Robertson, 2011) that serves as a means of 
listening to what a text has to say and coming to a deeper understanding of that text 
(Keator, 2018).  Lectio Divina allows practitioners to “enter into” understanding, rather 
than “dissecting” the passage under consideration (Foster, 1983, p. 24).  The practice’s 
ultimate goal is to move practitioners from “a kind of awkward acquaintanceship with 
God to ever deepening levels of friendship, commitment, and experience” (Keating, 
2019). 
As codified by Guigo II’s Scala Claustralium, or Ladder of the Monks, Lectio Divina 
consists of four steps: lectio (first reading), meditatio (repetition and reflection), oratio 
(prayer), and contemplatio (rest in the presence of the Holy Spirit), focused on a short, 
easily memorized scriptural passage (Robertson, 2011).  Martin (2017) frames each of the 
four steps in terms of a question for the practitioner: ‘What does the text say?’ (lectio), 
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‘What does the text say to me?’ (meditatio), ‘What do I want to say about the text?’ 
(oratio), and ‘What difference will the text make in my life?’ (contemplatio). 
In the first step, lectio, the practitioner reads the passage aloud “leisurely and 
intentionally” (Keator, 2018, p. 64), merely experiencing what the passage says (Martin, 
2017).  For the second step, meditatio, the practitioner repeats the passage while 
ruminating, or metaphorically “chewing on” (Keator, 2018, p. 120) the text, focusing 
intently not just on meaning, but on one’s own reaction emotionally, experientially, 
and intellectually (Robertson, 2011).  The third step, oratio, asks practitioners to offer 
their “heartfelt response” (Keator, 2018, p. 155) to the text and the fruits of their 
rumination.  Notably, such responses were intended to be bidirectional in that they 
represented one side of a colloquy or heartfelt conversation; the practitioner would not 
only respond to what they have experienced, but also offer a prayer in hope of some 
sort of response rather than a one-directional prayer of praise.  In the final step, 
contemplatio, practitioners reflect on the totality of the exercise and what they have 
learned (Robertson, 2011). 
Importantly for its application in the philosophy classroom, though Lectio 
Divina is traditionally a solitary exercise done in the presence of other practitioners, it 
can and has been engaged with in group settings Keating describes as a “liturgy of 
Lectio Divina” (2019).  It was in that spirit I engaged with Lectio Divina in my own 
classroom, and I turn now to how the practice was incorporated in my Introduction to 
Philosophy class. 
 
3. Lectio Divina in the philosophy classroom 
This section describes how Lectio Divina was incorporated into my Introduction to 
Philosophy class.  Because it is my hope that my reflections can find application 
beyond the philosophy classroom, I have two goals.  First, I discuss metadisciplinary 
commitments that make Lectio Divina a potentially powerful tool for a philosophy 
classroom in the hope that instructors whose disciplines feature similar goals will 
recognize commonalities that may similarly make the exercise a useful tool for their 
classroom.  Second, I discuss precisely how the practice was incorporated into my 
course. 
 
3.1. Philosophy and its core commitments 
As a philosopher, I am squarely rooted in the analytic tradition, which has been the 
dominant Western philosophical tradition since the late 19th Century (Glock, 2008).  
Analytic philosophy focuses almost exclusively on propositions that can be used to 
construct arguments (Passmore, 1957) and stands in contrast to other philosophical 
traditions (e.g. Continental philosophy) that are more amenable to nonpropositional, 
nonrational, or nonargumentative approaches (Levy, 2003; Williams, 1985).5 
To say that a claim has propositional content is to say that the claim is truth-
evaluable, or able to be judged as true or false based on whether it accurately 
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or nonargumentative, or to say that other traditions are significantly so.  As discussed below, what sets 
analytic philosophy apart from these traditions is its commitment to propositionality and rationality 
above all; to admit a nonpropositional, nonrational, or nonargumentative approach to any meaningful 
degree beyond basic intuitive appeals is by itself a significant break from the analytic tradition.  Further, 
this description oversimplifies the divisions between philosophical traditions somewhat. Philosophers 
will draw from traditions of which they are not a part. Especially in light of calls to diversify course 
offerings, analytically-minded instructors are doing a better job incorporating non-analytic sources. 
Philosophers can straddle more than one tradition (e.g., analytic feminist philosophy) in their own 
practice. But in such cases, such branching out is primarily viewed through the lens of one’s primary 
tradition. Thus, though analytic philosophers may be moved to include Buddhist philosophy in their 
course, they will likely analyze and interpret it through an analytic lens. 
represents the world.  For example, if I were to stub my toe, the expression “Wright is 
in pain” would be truth-evaluable, while the actual pain I experience would not be 
truth-evaluable; it would merely be.  Both can be mental content, either in the form of 
beliefs (e.g., “I am in pain”) or direct experiences (“OUCH!”).  Traditionally, the former 
sort of mental content is classified as cognitive content and the latter as noncognitive 
content (Thagard, 2019).  Thus, if philosophy is primarily interested in propositional 
content as its domain, it will necessarily favor cognitive content over noncognitive 
content, since only the former is truth-evaluable.  Generally, the only philosophically 
meaningful noncognitive content is intuition, the nonpropositional seeming that a 
claim (e.g., “Murder is wrong”) is true or false.  Often, propositional reasons can be 
provided for intuitive claims (e.g., “Murder is wrong because it violates rights”), but 
such propositional reasons stand alongside, rather than instead of, one’s intuitions. 
The primacy of propositional content and corresponding exclusion of 
noncognitive content is reinforced for introductory students by highly regarded 
introductory textbooks.6  Even primary sources commonly used in introductory 
courses, like Aristotle’s Rhetoric, make similar points.7  Such exclusion at the 
introductory level is problematic for two reasons. 
First, noncognitive reactions play a significant role in our reasoning processes 
such as the effect of negative emotional experiences on reasoning (Blanchette, 2006; 
Blanchette & Caparos, 2013; Blanchette, Lindsay, & Davies, 2014; Blanchette & 
Richards, 2004, 2010), noncognitive motivations for motivated reasoning and the 
                                                        
6 For example, Sober describes philosophy as interested in “fundamental questions of justification” and 
the “enterprise of clarifying concepts” (2008, p. 4). Shafer-Landau (2009) argues that noncognitive 
theories of ethics render ethical claims absurd, unpersuasive, and unintelligible.   
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corresponding backfire effect (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Wood & Porter, 2019), and 
expressive responding (Prior, Sood, & Khanna, 2015; Schaffner & Luks, 2018). Ignoring 
the role noncognitive reactions play in reasoning would thus impede students’ 
cognitive development and reduce the probability that students will develop virtuous 
reasoning habits.  
The second problem with eliminating noncognitive reactions from the 
philosophy classroom relates to philosophical skill development (Wright, 2019). 
Philosophy courses aim to develop students’ abilities to understand philosophical 
concepts, analyze arguments, develop personal philosophical views, and successfully 
engage in philosophical practice (Besong, 2016; Burkard, 2017). These disciplinary skills 
are themselves often based on more fundamental disciplinary skills like distinguishing 
between argument types (Turner, 2013), argument construction, and evaluation 
(Cashmore, 2015), as well as transdisciplinary skills like college-level writing (Burkard, 
2017; Cashmore, 2015; Turner, 2013) and metacognitive skills (Stokes, 2012). Such skills 
development can be similarly impacted by noncognitive reactions by not providing 
students the opportunity to engage with and process feelings of discomfort, frustration, 
pride, satisfaction, and so forth as they develop these skills. 
For both reasons, implementing a reflective practice that afforded students the 
opportunity to be aware of and engage with their cognitive and noncognitive reactions 
to course material seemed appropriate for the course. A modified, secularized form of 
Lectio Divina was implemented in my classroom to give students the chance to examine 
both kinds of reactions. I turn now to a description of how the practice instantiated in 
my classroom. 
 
3.2. Implementing Lectio Divina in the philosophy classroom 
Because of the problems identified above, I introduced a secularized version of Lectio 
Divina to my Introduction to Philosophy class.  The goal was to give students space to 
explore their reactions to course material in a way that made them more aware of their 
reactions and how those reactions informed their views.  At the beginning of the 
semester, I discussed with students the history of Lectio Divina, the goals of 
Contemplative Pedagogy generally, how the exercise would work in our class, and how 
I hoped students would benefit. 
The exercise took place at the beginning of each class with a pre-selected text 
intended to illustrate an important or difficult facet of the day’s topic.  For example, 
when discussing Aristotle’s view that death is bad because it robs us of that which is 
most valuable to us—our selves and our experiences—we focused on a passage from 
Marquis’ “Why abortion is immoral” that discussed why murder is especially morally 
serious: 
 
The loss of one's life is one of the greatest losses one can suffer. The loss 
of one's life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and 
enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one's future… When 
I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have 
been part of my future personal life, but also what I would come to 
value. Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my 
future. (Marquis, 1989, pp. 189–190) 
 
Before beginning, students were encouraged to make whatever preparations 
they viewed as necessary for engaging wholly and intentionally with the text, such as 
lowing laptop screens or sitting comfortably.  After the class had settled in, I read the 
passage aloud to the students.  The text was included in daily handouts so students 
could read along. 
For the meditatio step, I would read the passage aloud a second time and give 
students time to reread the passage and individually reflect on their reaction. As Fr. 
Martin described it above, the meditatio step gives practitioners a chance to 
contemplate what the text says to them. Thus, students were encouraged to reflect on 
features of the text like its main idea, why the author makes a point in a particular way, 
the difficulty of understanding the text, or one’s emotional reaction to the text.  
Initially, students were given approximately three minutes of silent reflection 
time. This gradually shortened to about two minutes for reasons discussed in the next 
section.  
The next step, oratio, was perhaps the most heavily modified of the four steps 
for secular practice.8 Rather than have students pray over the object of their 
contemplation, this step encouraged students to participate in small group discussions 
about their reactions in the previous meditatio step. In the spirit of Fr. Martin’s 
description of oratio as asking what one wants to say about the text, as well as Fr. 
Keating’s idea of the “liturgy of Lectio Divina,” students were asked to share an insight 
that they had during their contemplation. Typically, this step lasted for two or three 
minutes and was frequently cut off, despite ongoing discussion, in the interest of time. 
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or heartfelt conversation, in all cases, this dialogue was still intended to be prayerful. In the class’s 
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The final step, contemplatio, was another opportunity for students to silently 
and individually reflect on the overall experience before beginning class discussion. 
Like the meditatio step, students were initially given about three minutes, though this 
gradually reduced to about two for similar reasons discussed below. 
Following the exercise, I facilitated an all-class discussion by asking what 
takeaways or insights students had to the text we had just examined. It was stressed to 
students both at the beginning of the semester and periodically throughout that the 
goal of this discussion was merely to catalogue reactions, rather than examine them 
critically, in an effort to encourage students to share even tentative or potentially 
problematic reactions to the text. Thus, the discussion allowed comments 
summarizing individual reactions, group interactions during oratio small group 
discussions, or reactions to points raised during the larger discussion, while not 
allowing evaluative (e.g., claims that prior contributions were good, bad, correct, or 
incorrect) contributions. Students were asked to withhold such contributions until the 
class had moved on from the exercise. During discussion, I collated student responses 
on a classroom white board, creating a record of the conversation as a tool to help me 
quickly review and organize student thoughts and as a reference for discussion 
throughout the remainder of the class. This discussion was allowed to run as long as 
students had contributions to make; on average, daily discussion lasted between 10 and 
15 minutes. Overall, the exercise took between 20 and 25 minutes, with some individual 
sections taking as long as 35 minutes. This obviously represents a significant time 
commitment on the part of the instructor that may require active management and 
adjustment; I share some strategies for managing the time commitment below. 
Discussion bridged the Lectio Divina exercise and the remainder of the class. By 
giving space to voice their views and reactions in a judgment-free context, students 
were able to begin working through their noncognitive responses to the day’s material 
and engage in rudimentary philosophical analysis. As the instructor, I was able to 
collate student reactions in a way that allowed me to quickly note common areas of 
concern or struggle, points of interest, and content mastery. This allowed me to modify 
my lesson to maximize its impact on students; I had a sense of which concepts I needed 
to spend more time on, what ancillary issues were worth further exploration because 
of student interest, and how noncognitive reactions were coloring student responses to 
the day’s topic. This led to a number of benefits, discussed below. 
 
4. The benefits and challenges of incorporating Lectio Divina into 
the classroom 
Though students’ work during this exercise was largely personal—I obviously had no 
access to students’ mental states and deliberately refrained from inserting myself into 
small group discussions—the fruits of the activity were readily apparent in the daily 
all-class discussions.  Thus, much of my focus on the benefits and challenges will relate 
more directly to these discussions than to four initial steps. 
During my time as a philosopher, I have taught approximately 75 individual 
sections of philosophy courses, usually in an introductory setting.  While these 
experiences do not constitute data in a more formal sense, they represent a rich well of 
experience from which I am able to make meaningful, though tentative, conclusions.  
When reflecting on student experiences in sections that incorporated Lectio Divina as 
compared to those that did not, three benefits seemed to manifest themselves.  First, 
students were able to engage in and react to noncognitive aspects of philosophical 
practice, aspects that are often ignored in the practice of analytic philosophy.   Second, 
students seemed more willing to engage with the material in novel, interesting, and 
unexpected ways as a result of their engagement with the practice.  Finally, the Lectio 
Divina activity provided students a valuable opportunity to engage in important 
aspects of philosophical practice independent of my instruction.  In addition, I noted 
three challenges I believe are worth discussing explicitly: the time the exercise 
required, an occasional lack of student engagement, and the exercise’s perceived 
religiosity. 
 
4.1. Benefit: Attention to cognitive and noncognitive aspects of philosophical practice 
As noted previously, ignoring noncognitive responses and their effects on reasoning is 
both inappropriate and inauthentic.  Further, we are sometimes unaware of our 
noncognitive responses absent the opportunity to engage with them directly.  
Confusion and frustration are regular parts of even the most gifted philosopher’s 
practice, and such responses are especially common among introductory students.  
The Lectio Divina exercise discussed above seemed to provide students with a valuable 
opportunity to engage in and reflect on these responses, in addition to their 
engagement with cognitive responses.   
For example, during the aforementioned discussion of Marquis, students were 
not only able to analyze Marquis’ main point, but also used the space to discuss 
emotional reactions to the text; multiple students noted the topic and text felt “heavy,” 
“scary,” and “dark.” During discussion, students noted that this was likely due to 
having never thought intentionally about their own mortality.  Here and elsewhere, 
students also felt comfortable expressing confusion and frustration, with regular 
questions about the text, its meaning, or the author’s intention.  Such expressions 
seemed to go well beyond the typical “I don’t get it” often expressed in class and left at 
that.  For example, a student discussing Marquis expressed discomfort with Marquis 
because of his ultimate use of the excerpt as the lynchpin of an argument against 
abortion’s immorality.  A discussion of health and disease led to questions about 
questions about why certain terminology may be more preferable, while a discussion 
of metaphilosophy led to questions about particular sentences and phrases. Such 
questions, in addition to making it easier to see where student difficulty lay, made 
general expressions of confusion more helpful as well; students who expressed such 
confusion were more likely to be genuinely, totally confused, which signaled where 
additional time needed to be spent helping students understand. 
In short, the exercise gave students a chance to express their noncognitive 
reactions to the text, along with how those reactions impacted their reasoning, while 
also allowing students to more precisely articulate their cognitive confusions.  Such 
engagement is not typical, at least within my experience as an instructor and colleague, 
because the structures that allow for such engagement are not typically present in the 
philosophy classroom.  This engagement seemed to increase both student 
understanding of the material and their understanding of how their noncognitive 
reactions impacted their thinking while also allowing me a better perspective on the 
difficulties students faced. 
 
4.2. Benefit: Students were more willing to offer novel and risky interpretations of class 
material 
Because the discussions merely aimed at collecting student responses without any 
evaluation of these interpretations, students seemed more willing to offer novel or 
risky interpretations of the material when compared to more traditional presentations 
of the same material.  Most notably, students were comfortable voicing concerns that 
arguments presented were weak, incomplete, or insufficiently charitable, claiming, for 
example, that Wakefield’s (2007) view of health and disease would stigmatize the 
mentally ill, that Mackie’s (1955) version of the argument from evil was mocking and 
contemptuous of genuine believers, or whether Kierkegaard’s leap of faith9 justified 
belief in conspiracy theories like the anti-vax movement.  In perhaps the clearest 
example of the risks students were willing to take, students were comfortable voicing 
concerns that Kelly James Clark’s (2008) argument for God’s existence via direct 
experience did not constitute doing philosophy, which in essence meant that 
introductory students with less than a semester’s formal training felt comfortable 
challenging whether a respected philosopher was actually engaging in philosophy. 
Such interpretations can be risky for students, especially at the introductory level, 
where students frequently seeking the instructor’s definitive answer to a question.  In 
all my years of teaching, I can’t recall another instance of a student flatly declaring that 
what we did simply wasn’t philosophy outside of this exercise. 
Naturally, some interpretations were problematic, incomplete, or simply 
wrong—nothing about the exercise changed the fact that my students were novices—
but this chance to be wrong in a low stakes environment was valuable in and of itself.  
The interpretations students provided were a valuable jumping-off point for daily 
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discussion; I not only had a better sense of what my students were thinking, but their 
interpretations were often either right or wrong in interesting ways meriting further 
discussion. 
 
4.3. Benefit: Students engaged in independent philosophical practice 
The final advantage offered by the exercise was the opportunity it afforded for 
students to engage in key aspects of philosophical practice independent of my 
instruction. As Gregory (2015) notes, traditional pedagogies struggle to produce critical, 
questioning students because such pedagogies aim to assess students mainly via 
repetition of knowledge first provided by the instructor. Similarly, introductory 
students often crave an environment where knowledge is transferred from instructor 
to student, rather than constructed, because of their present state of intellectual 
development (Ambrose, Bridges, Lovett, DiPietro, & Norman, 2010; Lochrie, 1989; 
Perry, 1970). 
As a result, one of the greatest challenges of introductory philosophy—though 
not unique to philosophy—is moving students away from the view that the instructor 
is the sole source of knowledge and towards student confidence in their own abilities 
to analyze, interpret, and construct arguments independently. In other words, one of 
the primary challenges I face each semester is how to get students to do philosophy 
either without me or alongside me. This exercise has proven to be an invaluable 
resource for realizing this aim.  
For example, throughout the semester, daily reflections led to basic versions of 
the free will defense, discussions of the limits on God’s perfection, conditions under 
which evidence-free belief might be appropriate, and whether there was a meaningful 
distinction between death and an unrecoverable coma. In each case, the ideas 
expressed by students were concepts or arguments I intended to raise after the exercise 
had been completed. Further, these ideas are necessarily provided independent of my 
instruction, since reflection takes place at the facilitate. Students use the reflection as 
an opportunity to do philosophy.  
The sorts of responses offered in this section and previous sections often just do 
constitute doing philosophy. Students are constructing meaning and interpreting 
views. They are attending to noncognitive reactions and how those reactions impact 
their beliefs. They are crafting objections and counterexamples. They were able to do 
this each day without my help. Furthermore, because of the bridge function the end-
of-exercise discussion served, interpretations offered by students frequently formed 
the foundation of the remainder of class by serving as a jumping off point or callback 
when discussing the bulk of the day’s material. A question about interpretation, for 
example, can serve as a valuable starting point when introducing a topic. A nascent 
objection can both be previewed during presentation of an argument (e.g., noting that 
a particular premise might need additional defense because of concerns raised earlier) 
and serve as the basis for a more fully-developed objection. In short, I’ve never done a 
regular exercise that has led me to respond to students with some version of “We’re 
going to come back to this” as frequently as this exercise did. 
 
4.4. Challenge: The activity’s time commitment 
The four steps of the Lectio Divina activity took approximately ten minutes each day, 
followed by additional discussion of approximately 10–15 minutes.  Thus, on average, 
the entire activity took between 20 and 25 minutes, with some daily discussions of 30 
minutes or more.  While not a significant challenge in my own class, this length of time 
can obviously be challenging when considering the time available for each session. 
Because my class met for 75 minute sessions, even on days that generated the 
most discussion, I still had over half of the class time available to cover remaining 
material.  The most serious challenge I faced was that Lectio Divina precluded other 
group activities, since such activities tend to be similarly time intensive.  However, not 
every instructor has 75 minutes for each period.  Thus, considering strategies to 
mitigate time concerns would be worthwhile.  I shall discuss some strategies related to 
this challenge in the next section, but I believe it important to note the challenge 
explicitly here. 
 
4.5. Challenge: Student engagement 
During the semester in which the Lectio Divina activity was implemented, I taught 
three sections of Introduction to Philosophy.  In two sections, the activity seemed well-
received with active, robust participation.  The third section, however, proved to have a 
serious, persistent issue with student engagement.  A review of the discussions for this 
section showed students who seemed to contribute less or move on more quickly 
during the oratio step; while other sections regularly had to be cut off, this section 
seemed to either drift off topic or peter out. 
Unlike the time commitment discussed above, I have no suggestions for 
addressing this concern above and beyond general strategies for addressing 
disengaged students.  Personally, this disengagement was particularly difficult for me 
both because of the value other sections seemed to be receiving from the exercise and 
the aid it provided me as the instructor.  While the Lectio Divina exercise was generally 
very well-received by my students, instructors who wish to implement a similar 
activity would do well to consider how to respond to similarly disengaged students in 
advance so as to minimize any disruption. 
 
4.6. Challenge: Lectio Divina’s religious heritage 
Though Contemplative Pedagogy has incorporated a number of secularized versions 
of religious contemplative practices (Simmer-Brown, 2013), such practices invite 
concerns that students are either being compelled to engage in religious practice or 
that the related activities represent cases of cultural appropriation. 10  Though I did not 
face this challenge, it seems worthwhile to explore these concerns explicitly. 
Regarding concerns about the practice’s religiosity, I would point out here—as 
I did to my students at the beginning of the semester—that we are unproblematically 
surrounded by secularized versions of religious practices every day, such as yoga and 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction. As noted earlier, such modified practices are 
common in Contemplative Pedagogy. These practices are employed not because of 
their religious nature, but because of the benefits they provide. It would be wrong if I 
required my students to pray the Rosary or engage in Lectio Divina in an effort to bring 
them closer to Christ, but engaging in a secularized Lectio Divina to realize the benefits 
laid out earlier in this section requires no more commitment to Christianity than 
practicing yoga to realize the benefits of strength and flexibility requires a 
commitment to Hinduism. 
Concerns of cultural appropriation can be addressed by being forthright not 
only about what is being done, but also why it is being done and the context in which it 
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is being done. Employing a practice from any cultural tradition runs the risk of 
appropriation, and whether one impermissibly engages in such appropriation depends 
not on what one does, but how one does it. In the case of Lectio Divina, taking the time 
to accurately discuss what the practice is, its roots, and how and why the practice as 
implemented in the classroom differs from traditional practice provides valuable 
context through which students can come to more fully understand and appreciate 
what was likely a heretofore unknown practice. Such contextualization, done 
sensitively, is in many ways the opposite of cultural appropriation, which borrows 
from and fetishizes other cultures under a misguided sense of “otherness” or 
mysteriousness. Further, concerns about the power dynamics in cultural 
appropriation, where dominant cultures adopt aspects of marginalized cultures’ 
practices, is mitigated in the case of Lectio Divina, since the Christian tradition remains 
a dominant cultural tradition in the context in which the course was taught. 
Essentially, one ought to be highly sensitive to concerns about cultural appropriation 
when engaging in this or any other culturally-rooted practice, but it does not follow 
that such concerns cannot be satisfactorily addressed. 
 
5. What could be done differently 
On the whole, I felt that the benefits Lectio Divina exercise I employed outweighed any 
drawbacks or challenges. That being said, I also feel that the exercise could have been 
improved both to address some of the challenges I faced and to improve the overall 
quality of the exercise. In this section, I offer some thoughts on how instructors who 
wish to incorporate the Lectio Divina exercise into their class might modify the practice 
outlined above to gain maximum impact from its implementation. 
 5.1. Keep in mind that students are likely novice meditators 
The first thing I think could have been done differently, or perhaps more intentionally 
in this case, would be greater recognition that the students participating in the exercise 
are essentially novice meditators who have not chosen the class because of its 
contemplative component. In speaking with my students, few if any indicated any 
meaningful experience with meditation or contemplative practice, and the 
incorporation of contemplative techniques was not an advertised part of the class. 
Though the exercise explicitly took these facts into account—for example, the 
beginning-of-term overview of what Lectio Divina was and why it was being utilized 
was accompanied by a range of resources to further student understanding—there 
were aspects of the exercise where greater implicit recognition of this fact would have 
been beneficial.  
To cite one such instance, the time spent in silent reflection during both the 
meditatio and contemplatio steps may have been too long at first. Three minutes can 
seem like a long time to engage in silent, unguided meditation if one lacks previous 
experience. A major impetus for reducing the length of silent reflection throughout the 
semester from about three minutes to about two was the recognition that some 
students were struggling to remain focused for the entire time. Reducing the time 
spent on silent reflection seemed to help, but future versions of this exercise might 
benefit from a reduced period of reflection or greater guidance on how to engage in 
silent reflection effectively. In addition to the greater overall benefit such attention 
might produce, such attention may help with issues of student engagement; in short, a 
better-constructed environment for successful practice might reasonably be expected 
to lead to more engaged student participants. 
I should note that students’ novice status was not, to me, a reason to avoid 
engaging in Lectio Divina any more than one’s sedentary lifestyle is a reason to engage 
in exercise. While a sedentary person ought not walk out of the house and 
immediately run a marathon, there are levels of activity that even the novice is capable 
of, especially with guidance and training. Lectio Divina was, in my class, just such an 
exercise. Students were able to successfully engage in the practice and improved as the 
semester wore on. Even a novice can reflect silently for two minutes at a stretch, 
though occasionally with some difficulty. 
 
5.2. Keep textual selections explicitly related to the day’s topic 
A second change I would make moving forward would be to keep all of the reflections 
related to the central topic itself. There are many ways for a text to be related to the 
day’s topic, and some proved to be more fruitful for my students than others.  
For example, during a unit discussing the nature of art, I departed from my usual 
practice of selecting an excerpt from the assigned reading or a closely-related reading, 
instead choosing a poem to reflect on.  The goal was to give students a common touch 
point from which they could react and reflect on the theories of art we were discussing. 
In some respects, this effort was successful; having students offer interpretations of an 
intentionally meaningless Dadaist poem did an effective job of motivating 
antiessentialist theories of art, for example.  
Upon reflection, many of the benefits found in reflecting on these texts might 
have been better realized by analyzing them in a different context. As Robertson (2011) 
notes, though Lectio Divina can have an analytical component that emerges out of an 
imagined dialogue between practitioner and text, the practice is not intended to be a 
merely exegetical tool. To do so would interfere with the open, unguided aspect of 
Lectio Divina.  
Certainly, there were some reactions to the surprise twist at the end of one 
poem or the anger in some of the text, but the exercise itself tended to veer off into an 
analytical one that abandoned discussion of noncognitive reactions, suggesting that a 
more analytical exercise would have been appropriate for those texts. In addition, 
spending time engaging with the poem, rather than a text focused directly on one of 
the day’s key points, seemed to lower student engagement with the material itself; 
students seemed less sure-footed because they lacked the normal opportunity to reflect 
intentionally on the topic, rather than an exemplar. 
 
5.3. Have students complete the exercise on their own outside of class 
A third change that might be beneficial, especially if available in-class time were 
reduced, would be to offload some of the initial reflection steps. In discussion with 
peers about this practice, the main concern that has been raised has been the time 
involved. 20-30 minutes is not insignificant, even if one has 75 minute class time. Thus, 
a common suggestion has been to offload a portion of the initial reflection as 
homework. For example, one might provide the text in advance and ask students to 
read, reflect, and journal as the oratio step, rather than discuss in small groups. Doing 
so would significantly reduce the amount of in-class time required for the exercise; 
perhaps all that would be necessary during class itself would be the final discussion 
after students complete the Lectio Divina on their own. 
While this may be a fruitful strategy and I have mentioned it here because it 
may be best aligned with other instructors’ intentions, I have avoided this for three 
reasons. I mention them below so that instructors who wish to adopt the exercise to 
their classroom can better understand whether this change would be fruitful for them. 
First, completing the exercise in class provides a level of quality control. If the activity 
takes place in class, I can be assured that all students, at some level, are engaging in the 
practice and can take steps to encourage or direct student attention as necessary. For 
example, if students seem distracted by their laptop screens, I can gently suggest that 
the exercise may be more fruitful if screens were closed. Offloading the exercise offers 
no guarantee that students are properly engaging in the activity itself, rather than, say, 
quickly reading the text and jotting down a brief journal.  
Second, it seems to me there is some benefit to having the all-class discussion 
immediately after the exercise because the thoughts that occurred to students are fresh 
in their minds. This is not to say that there would be no benefits from the added 
reflection time that students may engage in having done the exercise prior to class, but 
on balance, my pedagogical goals seemed to align better with an immediate 
turnaround.  
Finally, I have endeavored to keep my secularized Lectio Divina as close as 
possible to the monastic form outlined above. One aspect of the monastic form is the 
collective nature of the exercise. As discussed above, even when individually 
reflecting, as opposed to instantiations of oratio that focused on conversation, texts 
were intended to be read or recited together as a group. Given the changes already 
made to adapt Lectio Divina to a secular college classroom, I was hesitant to make 
additional changes, such as completely removing the communal nature of part of the 
exercise. that were not strictly necessary for the activity to work successfully. 
 
5.4. Engage in the exercise less frequently 
For a variety of reasons, I chose to begin each class session with the Lectio Divina 
exercise. This led to a significant time commitment. If the time commitment is of 
concern to instructors who wish to utilize Lectio Divina in class, one option for reducing 
that commitment would be to engage in the exercise less frequently. For example, one 
might lead students in this exercise one per week or once per unit. 
Doing so would remove the benefit the exercise provided each day, but such a 
modification could provide much of the benefit with a greatly reduced time 
commitment. Perhaps, for example, one could lead a reflection on a major or 
overarching theme that presented itself over several days. Also, engaging in this less-
regular Lectio Divina might afford the opportunity to reflect as a capstone activity, 
rather than a kick-off; meditating on a text at the end of the week or unit would almost 




Lectio Divina has a rich tradition that lends itself well to in-class contemplative practice. 
This essay has sought to provide both background and context for the practice and an 
analysis of one course’s implementation of a secularized form of Lectio Divina, 
including a discussion of the benefits, challenges, and additional considerations one 
might take into account when implementing this or similar strategies. Though the 
context of this discussion was an introductory philosophy class, it is my hope that the 
practice itself and the benefits it confers are generalizable enough that one can adapt 
the practice to one’s own classroom regardless of discipline. 
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